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Small satellite projects often do not have the budget or schedule to incorporate radiation-hardened parts or extensive 
radiation test campaigns into their schedule. Yet a case must be made that the spacecraft will function as intended in 
orbit, with radiation, temperature and vacuum affecting part performance. The Vanderbilt Institute for Space and 
Defense Electronics, with support from NASA HQ, NASA NEPP, and NASA JPL, has developed a platform for 
making a safety case for systems with commercial (non-hardened) parts, called the Systems Engineering Assurance 
and Modeling (SEAM) platform. The platform has three elements: goal structuring notation (GSN), systems 
engineering models  (SysML and our extensions), and Bayesian networks (BN). The GSN  is a visual argument 
structure that presents an argument that the system meets specifications based on goals, strategies, and evidence. The 
systems engineering model is  a high-level descriptive language that captures the spacecraft design and system 
architecture through various diagrams. We extend the SysML diagram set to include fault propagation diagrams, which 
map the environment, failure manifestations, anomalies, failure effects and responses (mitigation measures) of 
components and systems. The SEAM platform provides a low-cost alternative to conventional radiation hardening 
assurance paradigms.  
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
CubeSats and other small satellites present a great 
opportunity for getting experiments into space quickly at 
low cost. However, that short schedule and low budget 
can lead to a high on-orbit failure rate because 
conventional radiation hardening and reliability 
procedures are typically not feasible during their 
development. CubeSats typically use mostly 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) parts, not radiation-
hardened parts. Many first-time CubeSat designers and 
developers are not aware of the impact that radiation and 
temperature can play in the performance of electronics 
in space. The low budget precludes extensive ground-
based radiation testing and the use of rad-hard, space-
qualified parts. The short schedule precludes the 
extensive documentation, lot-acceptance testing and 
reliability analysis typically used on NASA Class A 
missions. Consequently, CubeSats have a much higher 
failure rate in space than conventional missions (Fig.1). 
In this paper, we present an alternative to conventional 
radiation-hardening and mission-assurance paradigms, 
based on model-based system engineering and mission 
assurance, that can be performed much more quickly and 
with lower resource expenditure than conventional 
radiation hardening paradigms. We begin with a short 
review of radiation effects and describe the CubeSate 
experiment that we apply the assurance method to. We 
then describe the three fundamental aspects of the 
System Engineering and Assurance Modeling (SEAM) 
platform: modeling of the system architecture, 
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construction of a radiation safety case through a 
graphical argument construct, and construction of 
Bayesian nets to estimate relative probabilities of fault 
impacts on system performance. We then discuss the 
integrated assurance platform and its embodiment in a 
web-based application on a public website.  
2.0 RADIATION EFFECTS  
2.1 Total Ionizing Dose  
Radiation exposure produces relatively stable, long-term 
changes in device and circuit characteristics that may 
result in parametric degradation or functional failure. 
The total ionizing dose primarily impacts insulating 
layers. In state-of-the-art MOS integrated circuits (ICs), 
effects of radiation-induced charge on gate oxides are 
small, but field oxides and isolation structures are 
usually less radiation-tolerant than the active device 
regions. Total ionizing dose is specified in units of rads, 
which are units of absorbed energy per unit mass for a 
given material, for example, rad(SiO2) 
The behavior of these thick field oxides and shallow 
trench isolation regions dominates the radiation response 
of most unhardened CMOS integrated circuits. As 
positive charge is trapped in these oxides, negative 
charge is induced in the nearby Si. For p-type substrates 
or wells, an inversion layer will form when the positive 
charge density in the oxide becomes sufficiently high. 
The inversion layer can short the source and drain of a 
transistor together at the edge of the active area. It also is 
possible to invert the field region between adjacent n-
channel devices, leading to leakage currents between the 
drain of one transistor and the source of another. These 
mechanisms are described in greater detail, with 
examples, in [3-5, 15].  
The transistor-level leakage current shows up as a large 
increase in power supply current if significant portions 
of the die are affected. The net charge created by ionizing 
radiation is almost always positive, so field inversion is 
only a problem for n-channel MOSFETs. This effect is 
illustrated in Fig. 2, which shows the supply current vs. 
total ionizing dose for a D-Flipflop. 
2.2 Single Event Effects and Latch-up 
“Single Event Effects” (SEE) is an umbrella term for 
various effect that occur when an energetic ion deposits 
energy in a semiconductor device or integrated circuit. 
An ion from any element with atomic mass greater than 
that of helium is considered a “heavy ion.” The sources 
of ions are the sun and galactic cosmic rays. In addition, 
the Van Allen belts around the earth consist of electrons 
or protons trapped in the earth’s magnetic field. The 
actual “radiation environment,” or concentrations and 
fluxes of ions of various species, of charged particles is 
a function of orbit or position in space, e.g., the lunar 
radiation enrionment is quite different from low earth 
orbit around earth. A detailed introduction to single 
events is given in [6]. 
When an ion passes through a semiconductor in an 
integrated circuit, it deposits energy in the 
semiconductor lattice, which ionizes the  atoms in the 
lattice and liberates  holes and electrons, creating mobile 
charge in the device. This mobile charge can move to the 
terminals of the transistor or diode and cause current and 
voltage transients. The transients cause a wide range of 
effects including single event upset of bits in memories 
or latches (SEU), single event transient (SET) pulses, 
and single event functional interrupts (SEFI) in FPGAs 
and microcontrollers, which cause the digital device 
control logic to hang up in an undesired state. These 
events are usually non-destructive.  
Destructive single event effects include single event 
burnout (SEB) in power transistors, and single event 
 
Figure 1. CubeSat Success/Failure Rate [1]  
Figure 2. Impact of TID on supply current of D-
Flipflop, same part number, notice variation 
with instance and manufacturer [2].  
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latchup (SEL)in bulk CMOS devices. Latchup is 
common in COTS parts, since many of them are 
manufactured with bulk (not SOI) CMOS processes. In 
a latchup event, a regenerative condition occurs in the p-
n-p-n structure of the PMOS, the p-well, the n-well, and 
the NMOS that causes the devices to be permanently on, 
thus shunting current directly from the power supply 
Vdd to ground. A sustained latch condition can result in 
thermal damage to the integrated circuit and can only be 
interrupted by turning off the power for a short time.  
3.0 CUBESAT EXAMPLE: SINGLE EVENT 
UPSETS IN SRAM 
CubeSats make extensive use of commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) components that were never intended to 
operate in space. As a consequence, these components 
are subject to single event effects and total ionizing dose 
failures. The electronic component that is often the focus 
of research on single event upsets is a Static Random 
Access Memory (SRAM). These memories are 
ubiquitous and are extensively used by microcontrollers 
and microprocessors to operate of program data. The 
memory provides volatile storage of data, which can be 
individually addressed and written or read. Each SRAM 
cell stores a single bit of data in a bi-stable circuit. These 
memory arrays tend to be designed with the smallest 
available transistors, are highly integrated, and have 
large storage capacity. These three factors make them 
suitable for easily and quickly identifying single event 
effects. 
In the last 10 years a number of investigators have 
discovered that very advanced memories are susceptible 
to upset from proton ionization [16]. The possibility that 
on-orbit bit error rates might increase because of 
ionization from protons is disruptive to our reliability 
assurance techniques. The pressing question is how 
much of the overall error rate will this account for and 
do we need to change the way that we assess the 
vulnerability of parts? 
The CubeSat program at Vanderbilt was conceived to 
generate data for research on the effects of radiation on 
modern microelectronics. The RadFxSat platform is a 
system architecture designed to monitor single event 
effects and total ionizing dose in a component under test. 
The system conducts the experiments and interrogates 
the device, monitors and regulates power to the device, 
and reports the status of the device. On November 18, 
2017, the AO-91 satellite was launched into orbit 
carrying the second such RadFxSat payload named 
Phoenix. The Phoenix payload contained three instances 
of the Radiation Effects Modeling (REM) experiment. 
3.1 Radiation Effects Modeling (REM) 
The REM experiment was developed at Vanderbilt 
University to report on the occurrence of single event 
upsets in a commercial 28 nm SRAM. Although the 
objective is to observe radiation effects in the device 
under test, peripheral circuitry required to operate the 
device should be should be immune to or capable of 
recovering from single event effects. Each board 
includes the device under test, a microcontroller and 
non-volatile memory to conduct the experiment, and a 
system of regulators and load switches to provide power 
and mitigate against potential permanent failures due to 
single event latchup. All components are required to 
meet the total ionizing dose screening tests self-imposed 
by the RadFxSat platform (> 30 krad(Si)). 
During flight, the microcontroller handles reading and 
writing to the SRAM, counting the number of upsets, and 
communicating science data and health of the board 
through an I2C bus. The microcontroller writes a blanket 
checker-board pattern to the memories and checks the 
data after a 5-minute exposure. The total number of bits 
in error for the exposure is added to the mission total 
upsets and the experiment live-time is incremented. Both 
values are updated in the telemetry and another exposure 
begins. The two values together are sufficient to 
determine the upsets per bit per day.  
In Figure 3, a block diagram of the REM experiment 
board is presented. The memory required multiple 
voltage levels and complicated the design of the 
experiment. The input power from the spacecraft is a 
regulated 3V rail (blue boxes). This 3V is divided to the 
different power domains by load switches to create a 
3V_uC rail (green boxes) and 3V_switch rail (orange 
box). There are three voltage regulators on the board to 
provide the three voltage domains for the SRAM: 1.8V, 
0.9V, and a variable core voltage (red boxes). The load 
switches provide current limiting which protects against 
SELs on the board. These load switches also prevent 
 
Figure 3: Top-level schematic of the SRAM 
CubeSat radiation experiment REM board [7]. 
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high current conditions from propagating to the rest of 
the satellite. The load switches result in 5 different power 
domains on the experiment board which power all of the 
integrated circuits (ICs) on the board. 
The watchdog timer (WDT) assists the microcontroller 
in recovering from SEFIs and SEU. The assumption 
being that misoperation of the controller will result in an 
unhandled exception, out of bounds memory access, or 
program jump. Failure to make progress in these 
scenarios will trigger a power reset by the hardware 
watchdog timer. Configuration parameters are stored in 
an external, non-volatile memory to both provide a 
greater level of protection against (single-event) data 
corruption and to continue experiment operation after 
unforeseen power loss. 
4.0 MODEL-BASED ENGINEERING AND 
ASSURANCE 
Fundamentally, model-based engineering is a top-down 
design flow as opposed to the bottom-up design flow that 
takes place on many first-time CubeSat designs. The idea 
is to define the system performance goals and 
requirements first then identify the high level functions 
and their decomposition into more concrete 
implementable functions, and finally build an 
architectural model for the system and sub-systems that 
provide the functions.  -  Setting up the problem (through 
the models) in a systematic way, helps identify the 
functional and safety issues that need to be addressed up-
front while dealing with space missions, rather than as 
an  add-ons to typicall terrestrial design flow.. This could 
help avoid  potential  re-design from unexpected 
problems and  improve the chances of mission success.. 
Model-based engineering and assurance are in fact being 
adopted even for large space organizations like NASA 
[2,8]. In this section, we introduce some of the main 
aspects and advantages of model-based design, in the 
next we present a paradigm and platform that addresses 
the specific issues of small-sat mission development. 
A model can be defined as “A physical, mathematical, or 
otherwise logical representation of a system, entity, 
phenomenon, or process,” [9]. Models can be 
constructed for any physical domain, such as electrical, 
optical, or mechanical, and they can be classified as 
computational or descriptive [10]. A computational 
model is an equation-based model suitable for simulation 
in computer application, which can be deterministic or 
statistical. A common example would be the equations 
for circuit elements in a Spice simulator.  A descriptive 
model is a human-interpretable model that captures 
elements of system according to particular format, such 
as a block-diagram or flow chart. The System Modeling 
Language, or SysML, is a widely-accepted standard for 
a descriptive model for systems. It is a graphical 
modeling language that supports specification, analysis, 
design, verification, and validation of systems, based on 
 
Figure 4.  A functional decomposition model for “Count the number of upsets in the SRAM” [17]. 
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the four “pillars” of SysML: structure, behavior, 
requirements, and parametrics [11]. SysML defines 
different kinds of diagrams that represent the system 
including: behavior (functional), structural (block-
diagram), requirements diagrams, and lower-level 
diagrams such as state machine or use-case diagrams. 
Creating a SysML description of the system is the first 
step in the proposed approach. A functional block 
diagram showin the relationships between individual 
functiona and the components that execute them is 
shown in Fig. 4. A block-diagram representation of the 
SRAM experiment board is shown in Fig. 5, showing 
signal and power flows.  
5.0 GOAL STRUCTURING NOTATION  
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) is a graphical notation 
standard used to explicitly document an assurance case 
and defined in the standard in [13]. An assurance case is 
a reasoned and compelling argument, supported by 
evidence, that a system will operate as intended for a 
given, defined environment. This argument is made 
through a series of connected claims that support an 
overall claim. Acceptance of the assurance case requires 
that the argument by reviewed. GSN provides a way of 
documenting the assurance case that allows others to 
discuss, challenge, and review the assurance case.  
The GSN model provides structure to show how the 
overall claim is supported by sub-claims. These claim in 
GSN are represented as goals and blue boxes in Fig. 6. 
The assertion of evidence to support the truth of a goal is 
represented by a solution and the orange boxes in Fig. 6. 
When documenting the reasoning between the goals and 
sub-goals, strategy elements, the green boxes in Fig. 6, 
are used. These boxes are connected and show the flow 
of the argument from top to bottom by solid arrows, 
“Supported By” in Fig. 6, that show evidential or 
inferential relationships. These three types of boxes 
make up the main argument structure.  
To show how the system and it’s environment affect the 
argument, three different types of context boxes are used. 
The first are the generic context boxes, the yellow boxes 
in Fig. 6, which provide general information about how 
a goal or strategy should be interpreted. The second are 
 
 Figure 5. SysML Block diagram of REM board SRAM Experiment.  
Red lines are power flows, green lines are signal flows.  
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the grey boxes in Fig. 6, assumption boxes. Assumptions 
are premises that need to be true in order for the goal or 
strategy to be valid. The last type are justification boxes, 
teal boxes in Fig. 6. These boxes explain why a goal or 
strategy is acceptable. These three types of context boxes 
are connected the main argument structure by dotted “In 
Context Of” arrows. All of these boxes and arrows are 
show in Fig. 6 and a more detailed explanation of the 
example argument can be found in [7]. 
6.0 BAYESIAN NETS  
A Bayesian Net (BN) is a way of computing joint 
probalities by calculating conditional probabilities, for 
example, the joint probability of X and Y and Z, often 
written P(X,Y,Z), can be written as  
P(X,Y,Z)= P(X|Y,Z) P(Y|Z)P(Z) (1) 
 [14]. An example is shown in Fig. 7, which shows a BN 
for computing the probability that the data read from an 
SRAM is good given assumptions about the radiation 
environment. Each box in the graph consists of a 
conditional probability table, a matrix of probabilities 
that describe the outcomes given the value of the 
condictional variable represented by the incoming 
arrows to the box. It is possible to generate Bayesian nets 
semi-automatically from the fault propagation diagrams 
described in Section 7.1. The utility of a Bayesian net is 
that it is a way to quantitatively evaluate the probability 
of faults in a given system.  
7.0 SEAM: SYSTEMS ENGINEERING ANALYSIS 
AND MODELING (SEAM) 
SEAM is modeling language, supported by a web-based, 
collaborative modeling platform called WebGME, for 
supporting a mission assurance process. SEAM borrows 
a number modeling concepts and techniques from the 
standard SysML but it extends those with new features 
and adds completely new ones. It is compatible with 
some SysML features, including: requirement models 
and internal block diagram models, and those can be 
imported into the modeling tool.  
Having studied and used SysML on real systems, we 
found that it is not sufficient for supporting an assurance 
process – it needs several extensions. First, it lacks 




Figure 6. Explanation of Goal Structuring notation [2] 
 
 
Fig.7 Example of a Bayesian Net showing the 
probability of good SRAM data.  
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systems engineering activity. Missions need various 
functions from the spacecraft, hence the identification of 
functions and their mapping to various (hardware and 
software) components of the system is highly relevant. 
Second, it has no concepts for modeling component 
faults and degradations (to the environment effects like 
radiation), their effects and the propagation of those, and 
the impact of those on the various functions of the 
system. Third, it does not directly support the modeling 
of assurance cases: a formal or informal logical argument 
that captures why the system is ‘mission safe’, i.e. it does 
no harm that would put the mission at risk, in case of 
components failing.  
While recognizing that SysML’s extension mechanism 
based on stereotypes can be used to address these 
concerns, we made our solution through adding the new 
concepts as first class modeling elements to SEAM. 
Below, we briefly describe (1) the method used for fault 
modeling, and (2) how the various modeling aspects are 
integrated in the language.  
7.1 The Fault Propagation Model 
In order to understand the vulnerabilities of the system 
to be deployed in a CubeSat, it is important to understand 
the faults that could originate in each component and the 
local effect of these faults within the component and 
global effect across the system i.e. in other components. 
This information can be captured as a ‘Fault Propagation 
Model’ in the SEAM platform, which improves upon the 
SysML internal block diagram model. 
Fig. 8 shows the internal block diagram model (fault 
propagation) of a ‘Linear Regulator’ block (component). 
The radiation-effects such as ‘TID’ and ‘SEL’ are 
captured as fault (‘F’ nodes) which lead to anomalies 
(‘A’ nodes) such as ‘HighCurrent’ and 
‘LowOutputVoltage’ which further lead to functional 
degradation effects (‘E’ node) representing ‘Degraded 
Operations’ in the regulator. Additionally, the SEAM 
fault propagation model allows users to capture 
responses (‘R’ nodes) of a component to failures. This 
helps describe the mitigation functionality in the context 
of fault propagation.  
Further, the propagation of failures into and out of the 
component are captured through labeled edges 
(‘HighCurrent’, ‘WrongV’, ‘LowV’ etc.) connected to 
the input/ output ports. The interconnections between the 
component ports (in the system design) helps complete 
the fault propagation model for the overall system. 
7.2 The SEAM Platform: Combination of SysML and 
GSN and BN 
For mission assurance one is to build a set of assurance 
cases that formalize why the system is ‘safe’ – i.e. why 
it does ‘not do harm’ to the mission, even if components 
exhibit various failure modes. We argue that such 
argument can be built properly only in the context of the 
entire system, including its requirements, functions, 
design, anticipated faults, and its environment. Note that 
this task necessitates not just the collection of these 
 
Fig. 8. Fault propagation diagram for linear regulator operation [12] 
Witulski 8 32nd Annual AIAA/USU 
  Conference on Small Satellites 
models, but also the linkage among them. This is goal of 
SEAM: to provide a language for integrated modeling.  
In SEAM there various ‘links’ among the various types 
of models available in the language. Below we list a few 
of such links: 
• Requirements are linked to system functions. The 
meaning of the link is that the function implements 
the requirement. 
• Functions are linked to components. The link here 
means that  the component/s is/are required to 
provide the functions. In other words, if the 
component fails, the corresponding function may be 
lost. 
• Fault Propagation models are linked to appropriate 
functions through the functional degradation Effect 
(‘E’ nodes) and mitigation Response (‘R’ nodes). 
Here the links help understand how a function could 
be affected due to faults (anywhere in the system). 
• The ‘solution’ (or ‘evidence’) nodes in the GSN 
assurance case model are linked to specific 
components. The link means that the evidence is 
related to the specific component.  
Note that links are bi-directional and traceable. This 
allows various automated checks on the models for 
completeness, etc.  
The integration of the SysML block diagrams (with 
failure propagation graphs) and GSN provides a 
powerful modeling paradigm, where a target system (e.g. 
a spacecraft) can be modeled together with the assurance 
that demonstrates its mission safety. The interlinked 
models allow structural and informal checks on the 
integrated models for completeness, but, in themselves 
are not sufficient for quantitative analysis.  
Quantitative analysis of assurance cases considers the 
uncertainty (or ‘degree of belief’) in the argument and its 
evidence, hence it involves probabilistic reasoning. To 
follow this paradigm, we associate SEAM models with 
Bayesian Belief Networks (BNs). Currently this is done 
manually, but we are working on a (partially) automated 
solution.  
The reasoning for BN-s is as follows: The assurance 
expresses a logical inference chain structured as tree or, 
more generally, a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), with 
evidence at the leaves and the ‘top goal’ – the mission 
assurance statement at the top. The intermediate nodes 
combine evidence emanating from the evidence nodes 
and propagating upwards, towards the top goal. Given 
the calculation rules of the BNs and conditional 
probabilities at the intermediate nodes, one can 
propagate the uncertainty in the tree, resulting in a 
probabilistic assessment of the mission safety, in terms 
of the evidence available. Such inference is 
straightforward to perform and several tools are 
available. The key challenge he is how to obtain the 
intermediate nodes’ conditional probabilities. However, 
it appears the these can be obtained from tests and/or 
operational data.  
7.3 SEAM Website  
SEAM platform is supported by a web-based, 
collaborative modeling framework called WebGME The 
SEAM platform can be accessed online at 
https://modelbasedassurance.org where users can 
browse through demo models as well as register for 
accounts to create their models. 
SEAM platform allows users to create requirement 
models (SysML style), functional decomposition model, 
component library and system architecture model 
(SysML Block diagram), fault propagation model 
(extension to SysML Internal block diagram model) and 
assurance case model (Goal Structuring Notation). 
SEAM allows these models to be inter-linked so that the 
different modeling aspects can be contextually related to 
one another.  
Fig 11. shows a screenshot of the SEAM modeling 
platform. The users can edit the model by dragging and 
dropping model elements from the “Model Parts Panel” 
to the “Model Editor Canvas”. Models can be traversed 
via the “Tree Browser” or by double-clicking on a model 
element to move down the hierarchy. Model attributes 
can be edited through the “Attribute Panel”. More 
tutorial slides, papers and demo models can be found on 
the website. 
 
Figure 9. Relationship of the 3 paradigms in the 
SEAM platform. [2] 
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8.0 SUMMARY 
In this paper we describe a model-based assurance 
platform called SEAM intended to provide a systematic 
assurance case that a give satellite design will function 
as intended in the specified space environment. The 
approach is intended to provide systematic approach to 
assurance without requiring extensive ground-based 
radiation testing or the use of radiation hardened parts. 
The first element in the platform is a descriptive 
architectural model captured in SysML-like diagrams 
that articulate the functional decomposition of the 
design, the design structure, and the fault propagation 
flow between components. The second element in the 
SEAM platform is the use of Goal Structuring Notation 
which uses a graphical argument construct to build an 
assurance and safety case that the design operated 
properly given the characteristics of the particular space 
environment of the satellite. The third element in the 
assurance flow is the use of Bayesian nets to estimate the 
probability of observing degraded behavior or faults at 
particular points in the mission lifetime. The platform 
has been encoded in a browser-based application that is 
available to the public for free (though registration is 
required)  at modelbasedassurance.com.   
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Fig. 11. Screenshot of SEAM deployed on https://modelbasedassurance.org 
